

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2dMAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

3:PCF:jrm
5750
22 Jan 1981

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD), Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D. C. 20380
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)
(2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFLant, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533 (Attn: SC-103)
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Subj: Command Chronology; period of 1 July 1980 to 31 December 1980

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1D
(b) WgO 5750.1B
(c) GruO 5750.1A

Encl: (1) TransLant Agile Martin After Action Report
(2) Exercise Teamwork 80 After Action Report
(3) Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program (FFARP) After Action Report

1. Organizational Data

a. Designation and Location

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Corps Air Station
Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

b. Period Covered

1 July 1980 through 31 December 1980

c. Command and Staff

Commanding Officer LTCOL D. A. RICHWINE
1 July - 31 December 1980

Executive Officer Major R. J. RIORDAN
1 July - 15 December 1980
(None assigned 16 December - 31 December 1980)

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Richwine

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Administrative Officer Captain G. E. MOORE
1 July - 28 July 1980
Major B. E. POLEY
29 July - 31 December 1980

Intelligence Officer Captain R. R. BRIDGEMAN
1 July - 10 July 1980
1/LT T. HAMILTON
11 July - 7 December 1980
Captain R. A. MCNEESE (USAF)
8 December - 31 December 1980

Operations Officer Major P. C. FARMER
1 July - 31 December 1980

Logistics Officer Captain J. K. YOUNG
1 July - 31 December 1980

Aircraft Maintenance Officer Major R. E. HARVEY
1 July - 23 November 1980
Major R. F. THAYER
24 November - 31 December 1980

Sergeant Major SGTMAJ D. WASHINGTON
1 July - 31 December 1980

d. Average Monthly Squadron Strength

<u>Month</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
July	26	215
August	28	210
September	27	210
October	26	211
November	28	207
December	28	208

2. Sequence of Events

a. July

(1) VMFA-251 flew 343.2 hours/251 sorties; 9.0 hours/8 sorties

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were air-to-ground, 103.2 hours/87 sorties were fighter weapons.

(2) 5 July, two squadron aircraft and one crew were provided to back up the VMFA-333 TransPac. The aircraft and crew were flown to MCAS El Toro.

(3) 9 July, one of the VMFA-333 backup aircraft returns to MCAS Beaufort; the other aircraft remained at El Toro pending repair of a "Fodded" engine.

(4) 11 July, Captain W. P. LANNERT left for NAS Miramar, with one aircraft and 14 maintenance personnel, to participate in the Naval Fighter Weapons School's "Topgun" course.

(5) 12 July, one aircraft was dispatched to MAWTS-1 at MCAS Yuma to support the ongoing Weapons Tactics Instructors (WTI) course that Captain J. P. ETTER was attending.

(6) 14-16 July, the squadron participated in the 2d MAW Aviation Element Exercise (AveLex).

(7) 16 July, two squadron aircraft flew sorties in support of the JCS directed Joint Tactical Information Display System (JTIDS) evaluation.

(8) 21-25 July, the squadron hosted elements of VMA-223 (A-4M) and VF-43 (T-38) and participated in a mutual Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics (DACT) training program.

(9) 24 July, the aircraft left at MCAS El Toro was moved to MCAS Yuma in support of the WTI course.

b. August

(1) VMFA-251 flew 337.3 hours/214 sorties; 20.4 hours/9 sorties were air-to-ground, 60 hours/49 sorties were fighter weapons.

(2) 1 August, the squadron participated in a MAG-31 hosted AveLex.

(3) 2 August, one aircraft returned from MCAS Yuma and support of the WTI course. Captain J. P. ETTER also returned from Yuma after completing the WTI course and being designated a Weapons Tactics Instructor. The second aircraft in place at Yuma, was moved to NAS Miramar in support of the ongoing "Topgun" course.

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(4) 15 August, the squadron participated in the MAG-31 sponsored AveLex.

(5) 18-20 August, two squadron aircraft and three crews participated in the MAG-31 Missile Firing Exercise conducted at NAS Roosevelt Roads, P. R..

(6) 20 August, two squadron crews flew to NAS Oceana to assist in the evaluation of the 2E6 Visual ACM Simulator.

(7) 22 August, the two aircraft which were in place at NAS Miramar returned to base along with the maintenance personnel and Captain LANNERT, who had completed his participation in the "Topgun" course.

(8) 26 August, the squadron began flying "profile" sorties on it's aircraft in preparation for Exercise Teamwork 80.

c. September

(1) VMFA-251 flew 552.4 hours/219 sorties; no air-to-ground sorties were flown, 27.7 hours/15 sorties were fighter weapons.

(2) 9 September, the supply pack-up and some of the maintenance personnel departed for Orland AB, Norway and participation in Exercise Teamwork 80.

(3) 10 September, the remaining personnel and pack-up were sent to Orland. The maintenance chase crew for the TransLant also left Beaufort for Goose Bay, Newfoundland.

(4) 11 September, the squadron's twelve F-4s flew to Goose Bay, Newfoundland conducting aerial refueling over Cape Cod.

(5) 13 September, six of the squadron's F-4s left Goose Bay for the Trans-Atlantic crossing (TransLant) to Orland, Norway.

(6) 14 September, the six remaining squadron F-4s left Goose Bay for Orland, one aircraft diverted to Keflavik, Iceland for repairs.

(7) 15 September, the F-4 at Keflavik was flown on to Orland following repairs.

(8) 16 September, the chase crew arrived at Orland.

(9) 17-24 September, the squadron supported operations by MAG-40 while participating in Exercise Teamwork 80.

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(10) 25 September, the TransLant chase crew left Orland for Lajes AFB, Azores.

(11) 26 September, ten of the squadron's F-4s flew from Orland to Lajes, beginning the TransLant retrograde.

(12) 27 September, the squadron's two remaining F-4s arrived at Lajes.

(13) 29 September, eleven of the squadron's F-4s made the Trans-oceanic flight from Lajes to Loring AFB, Maine.

(14) 30 September, the remaining F-4 flew from Lajes to Pease AFB, New Hampshire.

d. October

(1) VMFA-251 flew 213.1 hours/189 sorties; no air-to-ground sorties were flown, 134.8 hours/134 sorties were fighter weapons.

(2) 1-2 October, the squadron's pack-up and personnel arrived at Beaufort following the completion of Exercise Teamwork 80.

(3) 1-4 October, the squadron's aircraft moved from Loring AFB to MCAS Beaufort bringing to a close TransLant Agile Martin.

(4) 15 October, 1/LT N. J. EPISCOPO departed for TACP school marking the start of the augmentation FAC program for MAG-31.

(5) 17 October, two squadron aircraft left Beaufort for NAS Oceana as the advance party for the squadron's participation in the Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program (FFARP).

(6) 19 October, nine squadron aircraft departed Beaufort for Oceana and the FFARP deployment. Another aircraft was transferred to the USN Test Center at Patuxent River for use in the F-4S carrier suitability program.

(7) 20-31 October, the squadron participated in the VF-43 hosted Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program (FFARP) at NAS Oceana.

e. November

(1) VMFA-251 flew 215 hours/151 sorties; 17.5 hours/7 sorties were air-to-ground, 47.5 hours/43 sorties were fighter weapons.

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(2) 1-6 November, the squadron continued with its FFARP deployment.

(3) 7 November, nine of the squadron's F-4s returned to base at Beaufort as the FFARP concluded. The main body and pack-up also returned on this date.

(4) 9 November, an additional F-4 returned from NAS Oceana.

(5) 14 November, the final squadron F-4, which had remained at NAS Oceana for repairs, was returned to Beaufort bringing the squadron's FFARP deployment to a close.

(6) 21 November, the squadron participated in the MAG-31 sponsored AveLex.

f. December

(1) VMFA-251 flew 281.0 hours/182 sorties; 3.6 hours/2 sorties were air-to-ground, 56.7 hours/40 sorties were fighter weapons.

(2) 1 December, 1/LT EPISCOPO departed for some four months intermittent TAD as a FAC with the Second Marine Division.

(3) 2-3 December, the squadron participated in Norad Exercise Federal Brave.

(4) 8-12 December, Major P. C. FARMER, Squadron Leader D. I. MCKENDRICK and 1/LT G. L. RAWSON participated in the MAWTS-1 sponsored Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACT(I)) course given at MCAS Beaufort and were so designated at its conclusion.

(5) 12 December, the squadron conducted a Winter Service "A" inspection and then held its annual Christmas party for the squadron personnel and their families.

(6) 15-16 December, the squadron participated in the Second MAW Anti-Air Warfare Exercise (AAWEX) conducted at Beaufort.

3. Narrative Summary

Although lacking assigned pilots, VMFA-251 began the second half of the year with operationally ready aircraft and a good training base of aircrews. The emphasis for the months that followed was on training; both on the ground and in the air. Primary focus was directed at increasing aircrew proficiency and performance in the air to air arena. This

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direction was consistent with the squadron's mission, its assigned tasking as the Second Wing's NATO squadron, and in preparation for the NATO Exercise--Teamwork 80.

July began with preparations to support the VMFA-333 TransPac with two spare aircraft. These aircraft launched to MCAS El Toro on 5 July. One aircraft returned to base on the 9th of July while the second remained at El Toro for repairs. In an effort to optimize the training available for squadron crews, Captain W. P. LANNERT was selected to attend the "Topgun" course at the Naval Fighter Weapons School. He departed with one squadron aircraft on 11 July. Fourteen of the squadron's maintenance personnel accompanied him to support the aircraft. On 12 July, one aircraft was sent to MCAS Yuma for use in the MAWTS-1 sponsored Weapons Tactics Instructor (WTI) course which Captain J. P. ETTER was attending. Local operations were directed at improving aircrew proficiency in Fighter Intercept (VID) and Fighter Weapons (ACM) scenarios. The squadron also participated in the Second Marine Aircraft Wing Aviation Element Exercise (AveLex) from 14-16 July. On 16 July, the squadron also provided 4 sorties in support of the JCS directed JTIDS evaluation with MACS-5. From 21-25 July, the squadron hosted 2 A-4M's from VMA-223 and a T-38 from VF-43. Missions flown during this week were in support of the squadron's Fighter Weapons workup and provided concurrent training for the VMA-223 crews. 24 July saw the aircraft which had been left at El Toro flown to MCAS Yuma for use in the WTI course. The end of July also found LTCOL RICHWINE at MCAS Yuma where he participated in the WTI commanders course.

August saw considerable aircraft movement as well as diversity in local operations. On the 1st and 15th of August, the squadron participated in local AveLex missions. 2 August saw the return of one aircraft, our support personnel and Captain ETTER from WTI--the course being over. The second aircraft which had been at WTI was transferred to NAS Miramar in support of the ongoing "Topgun" course. On 18 August, two squadron aircraft and three crews departed for NAS Roosevelt Roads and participation in the MAG-31 hosted Missile Firing Exercise. These assets returned to base on 20 August. Also on 20 August, two squadron crews flew to NAS Oceana to assist in the evaluation of the 2E-6 Visual ACM Simulator. All squadron assets were again at home base when, on 22 August, Captain LANNERT, the two aircraft and our support personnel returned from NAS Miramar and "Topgun". Up to this time, local operations had focused on improving aircrew situation awareness in the Fighter Intercept role. On 26 August however, emphasis shifted as the squadron began to profile its aircraft in preparation for a TransLant and participation in Exercise Teamwork 80.

Early September was devoted totally to the completion of profiling sorties on squadron aircraft, upgrading material readiness and in general

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preparing in all areas for the upcoming deployment to Norway and participation in Exercise Teamwork 80. The squadron's main body and pack-up left for Orland AB, Norway on 9 and 10 September. The maintenance chase crew for the TransLant operation also left for Goose Bay, Newfoundland on 10 September. On 11 September the squadron's twelve F-4s departed for Goose Bay and the beginning of operation TransLant Agile Martin. On 13 September six of the squadron's F-4s departed Goose Bay. One F-4 diverted into Keflavik, Iceland. The F-4 which diverted arrived at Orland on 15 September and with the arrival of the chase crew on 16 September, the squadron was intact at Orland and ready to participate as the fighter element of MAG-40 in Exercise Teamwork 80. Alert, CAP, FAD, and other intercept operations were flown in support of the landing force from 17-24 September. The maintenance chase crew departed Orland for Lajes on 25 September and ten of the squadron F-4s arrived at Lajes on 26 September. The remaining two F-4s arrived at Lajes on 27 September. The TransLant continued on 29 September with the movement of eleven of the squadron's F-4s from Lajes to Loring AFB, Maine. On 30 September, the final F-4 left Lajes and arrived at Pease AFB, New Hampshire.

The month of October began with the return to Beaufort of the squadron and its aircraft during the period 1-4 October. The return from Norway and Teamwork 80 found the squadron busy preparing for participation in FitWingOne Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program (FFARP) hosted by VF-43. Local operations focused on Fighter Weapons training in preparation for the FFARP deployment. On 17 October, two squadron aircraft/crews departed for NAS Oceana to act as the advance party for the FFARP deployment. Also on 17 October, 1/LT N. J. EPISCOPO left for TACP school. His departure marked the beginning of the Augmentee FAC Program within MAG-31. The remainder of the squadron personnel and nine aircraft deployed to NAS Oceana on 19 October. The squadron's twelfth aircraft also left Beaufort on 19 October for the Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River for use in the F-4S Carrier Suitability Testing. The squadron completed its October operations at NAS Oceana, participating in the FFARP syllabus.

Participation in the FFARP syllabus continued through 6 November. On 7 November, nine of the squadron's aircraft returned to MCAS Beaufort from Oceana. The majority of the maintenance personnel and pack-up returned the same day. Having remained at NAS Oceana for repair, a tenth aircraft returned to Beaufort on 9 November and the final aircraft on 14 November. Operations at home base were mostly oriented at providing familiarization and refresher training for three newly joined pilots and those augmentation crewmen who did not participate in the FFARP deployment. On 21 November, the squadron participated in a MAG-31 sponsored AveLex.

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December marked a time in which the entire squadron was present and not scheduled to deploy for the first time since October 1979. 1/LT EPISCOPO departed on 1 December for an intermittent 4 month period as a TAD FAC. On 2 and 3 December, the squadron participated in NORAD Exercise Federal Brave, flying sorties in support of the squadron's NORAD augmentation commitment. The period 8-12 December was marked by participation in the MAWTS-1 sponsored Air Combat Instructor Certification course conducted at Beaufort. At its conclusion, Major P. C. FARMER, Squadron Leader D. I. MCKENDRICK, RAF, and 1/LT G. L. RAWSON were all designated ACT(I)'s. Also on 12 December, the squadron held a Winter Service "A" uniform inspection followed by a Christmas party for the squadron's personnel and their families. The majority of the squadron's local operations focused on continued refresher training for newly joined aircrews. On 15 and 16 December the squadron participated in the Second Marine Aircraft Wing's Anti Air Warfare Exercise conducted at Beaufort.

The six month period begun with high readiness and a goal of increased proficiency ended with an improving readiness state, and a more experienced aircrew base. During the period, the squadron, or a part of it, was deployed during every month but one. The operational tempo peaked in September, and the flight hour program flown through the Teamwork 80 deployment that month took its toll on the material condition of the aircraft. This, combined with continuing personnel transfers occasioned by the pending deployment of two other MAG-31 squadrons, accounted for the squadron's reduced output in October and November. The end of the six month period, however, saw a swing toward continuity within the squadron and a resurgence of material readiness. The squadron is proud of its accomplishments during this period as it averaged over 323 accident free hours per month, continued a major aircrew and maintenance training program, and participated in wide-spread, demanding and diversified training. The "T-Bolts" continued to uphold the professional standards of MAG-31.


D. A. RICHWINE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2dMAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

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31 Oct 1980

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: SC-103)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)

Subj: After Action Report; Translant Agile Martin

Ref: (a) WgO 3502.1A

1. Commanders Comments

A transoceanic movement provides for a stern testing of a unit's ability to plan - operationally, logistically, and for material readiness. The squadron's planning began some months prior to the execution of Translant Agile Martin. The adequacy of preparation was borne out in the success of the evolution. Some adjustments, however, were required in certain segments of the evolution - usually due to GSE constraints. Other problems encountered required that some aircraft had to follow on the subsequent day. In the end however, all aircraft were in place not later than 24 hours after the planned arrival. The continued utilization of transoceanic ferry movements to exercise areas is a vital link in the training process. For many 251 crews, this was their first such evolution, and the lessons learned will carry them a long way for future endeavors. The most important facet of the evolution remains however, the lessons learned concerning enroute maintenance support. The need for a responsive and adequate chase crew to follow the aircraft to each enroute site cannot be overemphasized. With limited assets, the feasibility of sending a crew ahead of the aircraft could well result in not getting all aircraft out of the departure base. It should be noted that much of the success enjoyed in this endeavor was in no small part due to the considerations in planning shown by MGYSGT JANDRA, and the operational flexibility provided by the Transoceanic Force Commander, LTCOL BRUSH.

2. Data

a. Deployment Sites: Goose Bay, Newfoundland, Lajes AB, Azores, and Loring AFB, Maine.

b. Dates: Translant East: 10 - 16 September 1980
Translant West: 25 September 1980 - 4 October 1980

c. Number of Aircraft: 12 F-4s (2 additional aircraft were flown from MCAS Beaufort to Goose Bay as spares)

d. Number of Personnel (Officers/SNCOs/Enlisted): 27/4/23

e. Training Objectives Achieved: Transoceanic ferry. CRP was not affected

as crews were current in aerial refueling prior to deploying.

f. Flight Hours: 281.6 hours, of which 4.0 were night and 72.0 were day actual instrument.

g. Sorties: 82 ferry sorties were flown.

h. Ordnance Expended: None.

i. Targets/Ranges Utilized: Not applicable.

j. CEP for Delivered Ordnance: Not applicable.

3. Problems Encountered/Lessons Learned

a. Personnel

(1) Box Lunches

Comment: Box lunches were to have been provided for crews on each leg. The distribution system and quantity was poor at Goose Bay, and no provisions were made for box lunches at Orland (starting point for Translant West) or Lajes.

Recommendation: That initial liaison be made by movement control personnel to determine availability/feasibility of box lunches or a suitable substitute. If personnel assets preclude the follow through on the mission, it is recommended that squadrons be tasked with the responsibility of providing the lunches for their crews.

b. Intelligence

(1) Weather Services

Comment: Preflight briefing at Goose Bay and Lajes was enhanced by the presence of a Cherry Point weather representative. The briefing available out of Orland was as good as the MAG-40 Weather Service Officer could obtain data for. The briefed information was not considered as accurate or timely as desired.

Recommendation: Provide either better weather facilities/terminals on site, or provide for a point of contact at a well equipped base either in England or at Lajes who can pass current enroute information back to Orland.

c. Operations

(1) F-4S Stability Index

Comment: The problems encountered with available configurations data concerning the F-4S have been well documented; however, it does not alter

ENCLOSURE (1)

the fact that the squadron was forced to drop the LAU-17 pylons from its aircraft in order to fly with wing tanks in the 1G flight regime. This effectively makes the F-4E an AIM-7 only air-to-air weapons platform on its arrival in theater. Further, in that a reprofiling of aircraft was not feasible in Norway, the pylons were not hung, and the squadron operated with three tanks. The positive aspects that came out of this were: (1) the deployment and transoceanic movement went well; and (2) through extensive operation with the three tank aircraft, 251 is even more convinced that the stability of the aircraft is not as critical as to require a waiver to allow ferry flight with three tanks and LAU-17 pylons.

Recommendation: That an urgent change to NATOPS be made to reflect that cautions be observed, but allowing ferry flights in the three tank/LAU-17 configuration, thereby providing combat ready aircraft quickly upon arrival.

(2) Translant West Routing

Comment: Routing aircraft from Lajes to Loring to Beaufort appears easier from a tanker standpoint, but not from an operational one. The use of two AROP's from Lajes to Beaufort with an AST or two, and a divert to Bermuda would have provided for a much more rapid retrograde, and reduced maintenance/logistical problems. Routing one-half of the F-4s each day would have solved tanker fuel problems, and given that the Translant weather minimums were already set as circling minimums for takeoff/destination airfield, a cautious eye towards Bermuda weather could have determined the go/no go, considering the number of CONUS fields from Cherry Point to Jacksonville.

Recommendation: That a return routing from Lajes to Beaufort be examined for future exercises.

(3) KA-3 Pathfinders

Comment: The use of the KA-3 as a pathfinder/emergency tanker worked extremely well. The only problem is that one KA-3 leading six F-4s makes for an unmanageable situation in a weather penetration.

Recommendation: That the feasibility of sending cells of four F-4s/one KA-3 be explored for future Translants.

(4) CARE Clearances

Comment: Given that ALTRAV requests are sent in well ahead of time, and that in many cases altitude blocks are known not to be available, feed-back to planning units is needed in order to facilitate accurate fuel/bingo information. For the evolution, ALTRAV approval generally reached the unit the day prior to execution, which was not satisfactory. Further, altitude blocks must be known, even if routing may vary slightly. Finally, it is highly desirable to have a cruise climb altitude reservation; that is, one where the aircraft can climb upon reaching a lower gross weight at some point down range, usually on the

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final leg. Altitudes requested for Agile Martin appeared among the hardest items to achieve.

Recommendation: That timely and accurate ALTRAV approval be obtained, to include a cruise climb capability, allowing a gradual increase in altitude as gross weight reaches key points (example: FL 270 till 45000#, FL 310 till 40000# and then FL 350).

(5) Back-up Plan

Comment: The Transoceanic Force Commander's back-up plan, (utilizing spare KA-3s to escort delayed aircraft, or for providing needed parts runs) worked extremely well, and is considered to be the key factor to this unit's timely arrival at both Orland and Lajes.

Recommendation: That four KA-3s are required to support like movements, thereby covering all "what ifs".

(6) Tanker Rendezvous

Comment: Without fail, the first cell of F-4s at the initial ARCP of each leg were required to maneuver/take the observation position, while the tanker force sorted out its formation.

Recommendation: That when in doubt, the tanker turn earlier/increase speed earlier. A KC-130 at 190k is much more maneuverable than a KA-3 and six F-4s at the same speed.

(7) Icelandic Airspace Control

Comment: Though the second ARCP from Goose Bay to Orland was not in Icelandic airspace, the sector controller would not allow the receiver force to descend at its ARIP. Then, once off the tankers, the receivers could not climb to altitude at ENDAR.

Recommendation: That, in a like evolution when dealing with Icelandic authority, a movement control team representative make face to face liaison in order to preclude similar situations from recurring.

(8) UHF Radio Squelch Mode

Comment: United Kingdom (UK) ATC facilities require specific UHF squelch mode capabilities, which the F-4 has but the KA-3 does not, when operating on VHF in UK airspace.

Recommendation: That aircraft scheduled in the vicinity of the United Kingdom be equipped with a compatible UHF.

d. Supply

(1) Logistic Support for Resupply

Comment: Though the squadron's supply pack-up for the exercise was not all it desired, the inability of the squadron to embark more than the barest necessities with its chase crew, made the matter academic. Due to airlift limitations for the chase crew, the amount of supply pack-up was limited. The squadron was "lucky" in the following areas: (1) an aircraft enroute to Goose Bay was able to divert into Andrews AFB, where it was repaired by the Marine Reserves; (2) an aircraft was able to return to Beaufort for repairs; and (3) an aircraft diverted into Keflavik, Iceland, and received outstanding support from the 57th FIS. No aircraft required maintenance/supply support beyond the chase crew's ability at Goose Bay or Lajes. The delay in departure from Loring AFB is a good example of inadequate airlift supply support requirements.

Recommendation: That airlift assets be increased to enhance/support supply capabilities in order to maximize the efficiency of movement.

e. Embarkation

(1) Maintenance Chase Crew Airlift Plan

Comment: The following events regarding the movement of the maintenance chase crew appeared contrary to the published plan and made little sense: (1) The amount of pack-up/passengers to be embarked at Beaufort on 10 September was well known, as was a further requirement to move an NCCF-105 to Goose Bay. Yet, during the days prior to departure, the means whereby the 105 would be transported was changed daily, until it was finally passed down that it would go with our chase crew. The morning of 10 September, however, saw some disagreement on whether the 105 would go on the designated aircraft or not. (2) Only one aircraft arrived at Orland on 25 September to take the chase crew to Lajes--and it was late. This necessitated a shuffle of chase crew personnel within units in order to provide the best capability as possible at Lajes on 26 September. Despite all the plans to maximize our maintenance assets, five aircrew from other units needlessly usurped seats which should have been occupied by our maintenance troops on the leg from Orland to Lajes. (3) The second aircraft, finally arriving to take the rest of the chase crew gear/Fox to Lajes, was overcrowded due to Tech Reps, MAG-40 Staff personnel and additional aircrew being added. Chase crews historically fix and launch aircraft at one site, then follow them to the next site. With no F-4 support at either Lajes or Loring, we were asked to send our chase crew from Lajes to Loring prior to launching the F-4s from Lajes. Because this could have cost us aircraft stuck in Lajes, we opted to send only a plane captain to Loring to recover our aircraft upon arrival. We anticipated the remainder of the chase crew following the F-4s to Loring. The remainder of the chase crew never made it to Loring . . . and this lack of parts and maintenance people further delayed the unit's return to Beaufort.

Recommendation: The maintenance chase crew must have dedicated support; it must function as a chase crew, especially when operating away from F-4 support facilities.

(2) Main Body Movement

Comment: The squadron's main body was embarked from Beaufort prior to the aircraft departing for Goose Bay. Without the main body to work on aircraft prior to departure, there might have been no aircraft to move.

Recommendation: That exercise movement planners and transoceanic movement planners coordinate the movement of people/aircraft. Without the assistance of VMFA-451, this unit could not have made its departure on Translant Agile Martin.

f. Maintenance

(1) Ground Support Equipment (GSE)

Comment: The following facts concerning GSE had a definite bearing/impact on 251's operations at Goose Bay.

(a) The one NCPP 105 provided could not start eight F-4s in a timely manner. The first F-4s to start burned excessive fuel on the deck (2500 lbs). USAF starting units required more time per start and also caused fires on start.

(b) Goose Bay had oil pumped nitrogen carts vice air pumped nitrogen carts as briefed by the MAG-40 AMO. This resulted in pneumatic system problems in consonance with concomitant cold weather.

Recommendation: That units deploy with sufficient GSE to meet their needs. A minimum of two fully operative NCPP-105's and a full nitrogen cart is a necessity.

g. Ordnance

(1) Spare External Tanks

Comment: With airlift in short supply, it would appear prudent to store a reasonable amount of spare external tanks at deployment sites. This would preclude the embarkation/re-embarkation of spares with each deploying unit. It should be noted that this unit did not use any of its spare tanks.

Recommendation: That a quantity of external tanks be prepositioned at exercise sites for "on-call" use.

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31 Oct 1980

(2) Operational Readiness

Comment: The F-48 stability problem noted in the Operations section of this report impacts upon an already overtasked (due to personnel shortages) Ordnance section. Upon arrival in a war zone, the Ordnance shop, in addition to other normal duties, would be required to drop wing tanks, hang LAU-17/LAU-7 pylons/rails, and then get to the business of loading ordnance. The estimated time to deconfigure/reconfigure one aircraft is 16 manhours, which does not include electrical checks on the systems.

Recommendation: That an airframes change or transoceanic flight waiver be implemented as soon as possible.

h. Facilities

(1) Billeting at Loring AFB

Comment: During the Translant site survey, Loring AFB was apprised of the needs/dates of billeting for both Officer and Enlisted. Upon arrival at Loring, it was obvious that there was no movement control team, and there had been no follow up action on billeting since July; and indeed, there was no billeting reserved. The first night found some officers in the VOQ, with the rest paying approximately 15.00 apiece for unsatisfactory motel accommodations seven miles from base. The second night saw little change. One reason given for the situation was a "priority policy" for KC-135 personnel/passengers, which is totally contrary to the stipulations of AFR 90-9 (USAF Billeting Regulations). One can imagine the situation that would have occurred, if the crews from VMA-224 had arrived at Loring with the F-48s still there, or if the proper number of chase crew personnel had accompanied the aircraft to Loring.

Recommendation: That enroute bases during transoceanic operations be chosen based upon the availability of service facilities/accommodations, and that a movement control team be operative at each site chosen.

(2) Messing at Goose Bay

Comment: The personnel administering the messing facility were extremely flexible in extending their operating hours on the day of arrival at Goose Bay. Given that this was the only place to mess, many crews would have gone without lunch/dinner.

Recommendation: That movement control teams conduct liaison in order to ensure similar capabilities at all enroute bases where the need is apparent.

D. A. Richwile
D. A. RICHWILE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2dMAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

3:PCF:jrm
3502
27 Oct 1980

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: SC-103)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)

Subj: After Action Report; Exercise Teamwork 80

Ref: (a) WgO 3502.1A

1. Commander's Comments. The real value of a NATO deployment cannot be measured in pure training percentages. The total operational concept - - from TransLant, to in-place operations, and host nation interface, to retrograde - - all play a part in the worth of such an endeavor. Interface with our Norwegian hosts was excellent and the utilization of their facilities made for a much more "palatable" operation. The Marine Corps' ability to reinforce NATO was well shown and once the Marine Air Ground Team was linked together, the exercise went well. The initial days of the operation, with control still resting with the Navy, found our missions flying fleet air defense sorties instead of supporting the landing force. Having to wait until control was passed ashore for USMC air defense units to operate over the landward sector degraded the real training and air-ground interface that was possible. Once control was passed ashore the fighter/TACC/TAOC interface worked "as advertised" and provided for excellent training for all agencies concerned. The shortcoming noted in command and control, air defense plans and execution are all a part of the learning process and are the reason for the conduct of exercises. The "Thunderbolts" successfully accomplished their mission, and in doing so, learned lessons which should enhance future USMC operations in the northern NATO environment.

2. Data

- a. Deployment Site: Orland Main Air Station, Norway
- b. Dates: 10 September 1980 - 2 October 1980
- c. Number of Aircraft: 12 F-4s
- d. Number of Personnel (Officer/SNCO/Enlisted): 29/33/142
- e. Training Objectives Achieved: Transoceanic deployment to operating site, fleet air defense, maritime patrol, fighter escort and fighter intercept training. CRP increases are reflected in 1 - 30 September 1980 CRP Report.

EXERCISE TEAMWORK 80, AFTER ACTION RPT.

27 Oct 1980

ENCLOSURE (2)

f. Flight Hours: 241.9 in place hours, of which, 4.8 were night and 39.1 were day actual instrument.

g. Sorties: 127 in place sorties, of which, 123 were launched as CAP/fighter intercept and 4, on fighter escort missions.

i. Targets/Ranges Utilized: Teamwork 80 AOA consisting of overland and over water airspace to the east and west of Orland.

j. CEP for Delivered Ordnance: Not applicable as the squadron operated solely in an air to air role.

3. Problems Encountered/Lessons Learned

a. Personnel

(1) Autovon Capability

Comment: It is extremely difficult to get an Autovon call into Orland. The caller must go via West Germany then to Fliesland in Norway before a connection can be made to Orland.

Recommendation: That if Orland is a proposed deployment site for USMC units, the Autovon network should be modified to allow for easier access to Orland.

(2) Message Release/Comm Guard

Comment: The MAG-40 OPLAN called for MAG-40 to issue a Comm Shift and guard our Comm. Also, MAG-40 had sole releasing authority. During the exercise, this unit did not receive a single message and few "has been sents" of the two (2) plus messages it sent each day. The result was a message backlog at home base, and much missing information at home base, especially FREDs data.

Recommendation: That units submit their own Comm Shift/release their own messages.

(3) Centralized Admin Plan

Comment: Upon arrival at Orland, the pre-deployment plan of organizing a central administration section under the MAG-40 S-1 was initiated. However, its operation never materialized, mainly due to office space constraints in the MAG-40 Headquarters. This lack of MAG-40/squadron interface resulted in no PFR entries as to ComRats having been stopped, when indeed they had been.

Recommendation: During a deployment of this nature, either the central admin plan must be effected, or the Group S-1 must function as a Group S-1 --providing support to its squadrons.

(4) Missed Meals

Comment: Numerous aircrew missed meals due to flights/briefs/debriefs. There was a "supposed" provision for C-Rations, but none were made available to the squadron S-4.

Recommendation: That either missed meals be monitored and claimed, especially if there is a place to eat locally (in Orland, the canteen or club), or that "B" ration food be provided to aircrews based upon the flight schedule.

(5) Pay Call

Comment: The 15 September pay call went as scheduled, however, as the chase crew had not yet arrived, there was a considerable amount of cash left over. Disbursing would not hold that spare cash pending the arrival of the chase crew. This resulted in a large sum of money being locked up in the S-2 safe for two days.

Recommendation: That disbursing sections on deployments handle all pay not disbursed during scheduled pay call.

(6) Mail

Comment: Mail service from Norway to CONUS was relatively efficient; mail coming from CONUS to Norway was exceptionally slow. The mail plan which was to have utilized the scheduled "pony express" runs seemed to have its ups and downs - at times due to no plan, at times no airlift while at other times, mail preempted needed parts on cargo aircraft.

Recommendation: That a deployment of this type does not fit into normal FPO channels for distribution; therefore, special handling is required. A plan whereby mail from various sites to the common address is gathered and then dispatched, via commercial carrier if necessary, is envisioned as the optimum solution.

(7) Liberty Policy

Comment: Liberty for personnel stationed in Orland was possible in two ways: (1) for SNCO/Enlisted on a quota basis to travel at their own expense during a specific period from Orland to Trondheim; and (2) for Officers/SNCO's who were invited into the local village by Norwegian locals, etc.. The local town was otherwise off limits. Two morale factors surfaced from this: (1) those going to Trondheim had to return before anything was really "happening" in Trondheim; and (2) few officers or staff got any liberty. The local town was more than happy to accept more Marines, both for themselves and for the business they brought. After tactical aircraft retrograde, the 4th MAB Chief of Staff, upon visiting Orland and hearing the liberty policy, opened the gates.

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27 Oct 1980

Recommendation: That liberty policies reflect the capability of an area and the desires of the locals. It is recommended that a daily quota on local liberty be established in small communities such as Orland.

(8) Check to Bank

Comment: This unit attempted to stress the direct deposit plan as the soundest way to handle individual pay, especially in view of FMF deployments.

Recommendation: That all married E-5's and below serving with FMF units participate in the direct deposit plan.

b. Intelligence

(1) Threat Briefing

Comment: Although the CCLF/CTF 403 EXOPORD stated that the only Orange force surface-to-air capability consisted of 20mm guns, no brief was given by MAG-40 S-2 as to the location and capability of this threat.

Recommendation: That Group S-2 provide information at the squadron level as to the location, movement, and capability of enemy threats either at published brief time or whenever the threat dictates. Aircrews must be aware of all threats, air or surface.

(2) CMS Material

Comment: Confusion arose concerning the issue and accountability of CMS material from the Group.

Recommendation: That all necessary CMS material be issued to each unit by its parent command prior to the deployment, thereby removing the responsibility of accountability and issue from the composite command.

(3) Real World Information

Comment: The squadron was cut off from outside information and none was provided on world events, except hearsay.

Recommendation: That a daily world situation brief be given. Also, that a sufficient number of overseas "G.I." oriented newspapers (e.g. Stars & Stripes), be made available for distribution among the troops.

(4) Weather Briefings

Comment: Preflight weather briefings were inadequate with regard to depth of current observation, scope of forecast, divert information, etc.,

Recommendation: That a Mobile Weather Facility be embarked on future exercises.

c. Operations

(1) MAGTF Concept

Comment: The U. S. Navy does not have a firm grasp on the MAGTF concept as demonstrated by their utilization of Marine air defense assets while control was still afloat. During this period, Marine F4s did not fly a single CAP mission in support of the landward sector, but instead were utilized in a Maritime/Fleet Air Defense role.

Recommendation: That the Marine Air Ground Team be utilized, and that Marines support Marines. Navy fighter assets are well versed in Fleet Air Defense and should be employed in this, their primary role. USMC assets should provide escort, TARCAP and BARCAP support.

(2) AWACS

Comment: The AWACS is a prime asset for low altitude radar coverage and radio communication/relay. During NATO exercises the AWACS should be scheduled to cover all CAP periods. Only three missions were assigned to work with the AWACS during the exercise.

Recommendation: Schedule and utilize the AWACS as the prime CAP control agency over land sectors due to its surveillance capability.

(3) TACC Awareness

Comment: The Navy TACC often had no idea of the composition or mission of a scheduled sortie. Also, it apparently often had no idea that Blue Air was intercepting other Blue Air each day.

Recommendation: That Navy controllers be briefed on all aspects of the operation, to include the composition and mission of each Blue sortie.

(4) Concept of Operations

Comment: The squadron's mission was air defense of the landing force, but it was not employed in this role until control was passed ashore.

Recommendation: Coordinate with the Navy to ensure USMC fighters provide air superiority over the landward sector vice fleet air defense.

(5) Mission Scenario

Comment: Missions were more scheduled than fragged. The exercise had a flight schedule where, in reality, the tactical situation and intelligence gathered should dictate the frag. Only one escort and only one TARCAP mission were flown. All others were scheduled CAP.

Recommendation: Develop a scenario which allows for fragmentary scheduling based on a known sortie rate capability.

(6) Lack of Aggressors

Comment: Because of the constrained schedule and mission of Marine air by the Navy TACC, very few intercepts of Orange Air were made. The result was a series of boring CAPS with very little training value... a waste of money!

Recommendation: Provide a greater number of aggressor aircraft with a longer block time in the AOA. Ensure controllers use Marine air in the landward sector.

(7) AOA Airspace

Comment: Special procedures caused by the proximity of Amber 8 degraded CAP effectiveness in that aircraft had to be above 16,000 feet or below 6,000 feet.

Recommendation: If possible define an AOA that is free or, less restricted. Also, tailor aggressor entry/exit to play down the effects of any restrictions.

(8) CTF 403 OPLAN/MAG-40 Inserts to CTF 403 OPLAN

Comment: There was little if any information in either document on Anti-Air warfare or Rules of Engagement. In addition, the CTF 402 Pilot/Controller Handbook proved to be the best source document for air operations information.

Recommendation: That future operations utilize attached unit expertise in developing an Operations Plan that is supportive of the tasks and missions of it's units...prior to the last minute.

(9) Aircrew Briefing

Comment: Initial mass briefings and follow-on individual flight briefings were inadequate.

Recommendation: That MCCRES briefing guide standards be utilized in developing a checklist for aircrew briefing during a Group type operation. Suggest MAG operation representative interface with gun squadron Weapons/Tactics Instructors to tailor briefs to aircrew needs.

(10) Airfield Capabilities in Norway

Comment: Orland does not have a suitable arresting gear without the M-21. No other Norwegian fields have suitable arresting gear. No Orland diverts can start the F-4. No field is of acceptable length for a no-chute/emergency high speed landing.

Recommendation: That suitable arresting gear be installed at other selected Norwegian fields.

(11) Restrictions Imposed by the Terrain on Ground-to-Air Communications

Comment: Mountainous terrain (up to 7500 feet msl) in the AOA restricted ground to air communications from the TAOC located at Orland. Because Orland was effectively screened from the AOA by some of the high terrain, overland sector CAP aircraft often had to be above 10,000 feet in order to maintain communications.

Recommendation: That the TAOC or remote site(s) be located on higher terrain. During Teamwork 80, an early warning site was to have been established in the AOA in order to provide increased coverage against the low altitude threat. The site was operative only a short time due to lack of logistical support for placement.

(12) Terrain Effect on Radar Coverage

Comment: As with communications, the TAOC location had a detrimental effect on radar coverage. Aircraft paints below 8000 feet in many sectors was not possible.

Recommendation: Locate the TAOC and a remote site to provide low level coverage of the AOA.

(13) Terrain Effect Upon the Command and Control of Local Air Defense Forces

Comment: Though Orland was not theoretically in the AOA, real time protection of the base would be limited by the TAOC location. The TAOC's ability to control CAP aircraft located 50-60 miles from Orland (a reasonable outer CAP position considering the Hawk MEZ) was definitely limited below 8,000 feet.

Recommendation: Same as 3.c.(12) above.

(14) Need for Adequate Surveillance Against the Low Altitude Ingressing Threat

Comment: CAP aircraft alone, whether using radar, visual techniques, or both, cannot provide adequate surveillance against an ingressing threat. The weather plays no small factor in this situation. During Exercise Teamwork 80 the normal weather fell into one of two categories; either a

ceiling of 3-4000 feet with five miles visibility or, a layered cloud cover beginning about 9-11,000 feet with seven miles visibility. Assuming that the threat will ingress at low altitude, CAP aircraft must be either above the clouds to communicate/be under radar coverage or, CAP below, with no TAOC link in order to provide visual coverage.

Recommendation: The use of a combination of TAOC, CAP aircraft, early warning sites, and an AWACS aircraft is the only sure way to provide the necessary optimum command and control of air assets.

(15) Low Altitude Capable Weapon System

Comment: Operations in the mountainous terrain of western Norway requires a pulse doppler (PD) capable radar and the AIM-7F missile in order to ensure success.

Recommendation: That a strong emphasis be placed on maintaining the PD system in the AWG-10A radar and, that radar spares for the PD system receive priority attention. Also, it is recommended that a stockpile of AIM-7F missiles be provided for USMC units augmenting the northern NATO region.

(16) NBC/EW Training

Comment: There was no NBC or EW training during the exercise. The cool, wet climate would have provided an excellent opportunity to practice NBC defense. The lack of DACT or other demanding flight would have allowed ample opportunity for EW training.

Recommendation: That NBC/EW training be included as an integral part of the exercise objectives for all participants, not just ground forces.

d. Supply

(1) Resupply/Priority Parts

Comment: The FISDU plan did not materialize in its anticipated form. As a result, there was no sure means of obtaining priority parts. Even mail often preempted parts. One specific part was sent via commercial airline only to arrive at Heathrow, U. K., a site little better than Beaufort... if you're in Norway.

Recommendation: That if a NATO deployment is important, then the supply chain that supports it must be as important. Dedicated means of obtaining and sustaining supply support must exist.

(2) Repair Kits for Air Mattresses

Comment: Numerous air mattresses became unserviceable. There were no spares, nor were there any repair kits available for issue.

Recommendation: That units draw some spare mattresses and hold a quantity of repair kits for issue.

(3) Spare Outerwear

Comments: In a damp climate, the probability of one's outer garments becoming wet, even if rain suits/ponchos are available, is high. No spare field jackets, etc., were available for issue.

Recommendation: That deploying units be authorized to draw a surplus of outerwear for issue while their individual gear dries.

e. Embarkation

(1) Embarkation of Main Body

Comment: The squadron's packup and main body deployed on 9/10 September 1980. The aircraft did not deploy from Beaufort to Goose Bay until 11 September and were not in Orland until 13 September. Considering that the C-141's that lifted the main body had nothing to do with the TransLant, it would have been prudent to delay the departure of the main body until the squadron aircraft were enroute. VMFA-451 was forced to standdown its own operations in order to support this squadron's departure from Beaufort.

Recommendation: Do not deploy a unit's assets in an order which denies support to the aircraft. Maintenance personnel (main body) should arrive just prior to squadron aircraft.

(2) Pack-up Embarkation

Comment: Load plans for the C-141's had been approved prior to the aircraft arrival. An ALCE Team was in place, yet the Loadmaster of the final C-141 decided to load the cargo in a different order despite this unit's protests. When it was found the entire Hydraulics shop packup would not fit, the C-141 crew refused to off load the misloaded cargo and reload. As a result, the entire Hydraulics shop packup was left at Beaufort and had to be piecemealed to Orland on KA-3's and C-130's. The net cost was 4 sorties lost during the initial days of operation at Orland.

Recommendation: That USAF crews abide by load plans and that ALCE Teams ensure compliance. Also, that some surface shipping be allotted to air units for such items as SATS tents, fresnel lenses, M-21 arresting gear, bulky or low/infrequent use items.

(3) Logistical Support Aircraft

Comment: A "pony express" was scheduled to operate twice a week to provide priority parts supply. During the operation, the frequency, scheduled nature, enroute stops and cargo capability of these flights bore no resemblance to the plan. As a result, parts supply/resupply, to include the arrival of equipment specifically staged for these flights, was poor.

Recommendation: That an exercise operating on a bare base with minimal packup must receive consistent and timely logistical support.

(4) Amphibious Shipping

Comment: Early in the planning stage, this squadron was informed that not only was airlift to be minimal, but shipping as well. As a result, the squadron was not to plan on having a fresnel lens or M-21 gear. This same reasoning accounted for no cots and the use of Norwegian tents. In the end, the M-21 gear at Varnes was installed at Orland, but all the other items would have been nice to have as well.

Recommendation: That all the equipment necessary to conduct real world operations be present and used in an exercise.

f. Maintenance

(1) F-40 Jet Fuel

Comment: F-40 is the NATO equivalent of JP-4, but it is not the same. F-40 contains de-icers (alcohol), has a lower flash point, and affects engine performance.

Recommendation: That aircrews and maintenance personnel be briefed on the characteristics of F-40 and proper safeguards for its use.

(2) Ground Support Equipment (GSE)

Comment: Though airlift was a driving factor, the fact remains that there were not enough jet starting units at Orland. The F-4 does not start well on other than the NCCP 105; and given that we often had four aircraft simultaneously on alert status, the four NCCP 105's were required to launch in time. The squadron frequently had less than the required NCCP 105's which detracted from both air scramble capability and air maintenance capacity. The result was increased down time and AWM time.

Recommendation: That a deploying F-4 squadron must at the very minimum have four RFI starting units dedicated to its operation.

g. Ordnance. Not applicable, the squadron was employed solely in an Air to Air role.

h. Facilities

(1) Office Space at Orland

Comment: The space provided for the CO/XO, S-1, 2, 3 and S-4 was not sufficient to meet the need. The space was overcrowded and only S-1/S-3 could effectively function.

Recommendation: The Norwegian squadron building, used as the MAG-40 Headquarters, is what is needed for a single squadron. More space must be provided in the future, especially for briefing, and a CO/XO work area.

(2) Base Loading

Comment: MAG-40 effectively took a base where the Norwegians house about two dozen F-5's and brought in (when combined with USAF/RAF assets) over 40 aircraft. This concept left all the aircraft vulnerable (out of revetments) and turned the excellent reinforced shelters into makeshift maintenance spaces.

Recommendation: That like deployments to similar sites include planning for the split up of the Air Group, as will have to be done in a real world contingency. This will allow the Norwegians to remain at Orland and permit operations with the Norwegians instead of against them. This will also allow proper aircraft housing and hopefully better maintenance spaces.

(3) Suitable Storage for Aircrew Flight Equipment and Adequate dressing/"Suit-up" Area

Comment: The flight equipment storage and aircrew dressing area was located in the back of the Maintenance hangar - an unheated building that had no ventilation system other than opening the doors. Upon returning from a flight, each aircrew was usually soaked in perspiration because of the anti-exposure suits they wore and had to change in the cold/damp atmosphere. This was not conducive to good health - most aircrews developed colds, with several being placed in a non-flying status for a day or more. The poor ventilation also prevented the flight equipment from drying after each flight.

Recommendation: That the Flight Equipment shop be located in a heated, well ventilated area in future operations.

(4) Camp Layout

Comment: The tent camp proximity to the work area was excellent. The messing facility location, though not as close to the camp as desirable, was close to the work area. The greatest problem was in the distance from the showers to the tent camp - personnel often had to walk over half a mile back from the showers in cold, wet weather and mud.

Recommendation: That the camp complex be located as centrally as possible and that the shower unit, if necessary, dictate the location of the camp.

(5) Non-Variety of Menu

Comment: Due to a poor loading plan and some off load difficulties, an extremely large amount of Spam was served at all meals during the early days of the exercise. This situation had two facets - (1) Why the foul up and (2) Why all that much Spam in the first place?

Recommendation: With this exception, the messing was adequate in quantity and quality, but there should be every effort taken to provide the very best in a field mess.

(6) Shaving Water

Comment: After about the third morning in camp, there no longer existed a barrel with immersion heater to provide hot water in the morning.

Recommendation: That this facility is necessary within the tent camp and should be provided.

(7) Base Radio

Comment: Base radios are essential to safe and efficient operations. The MAG-40 insert to the Op Order indicated a base radio frequency, and the squadron was informed that a base radio would be provided. However, none was.

Recommendation: That a base radio be provided for, or brought by deploying squadrons.

(8) Norwegian Tents

Comment: The Norwegian nine (9) man tent, with its wooden decking and integral stove, is far superior to the GP in utility and not that much more cumbersome than the CP. The tents also seemed to be less prone to wind damage.

Recommendation: That the Marine Corps explore the possibility of procuring a quantity of these tents, with the specific purpose of use in cold/wet climates.


D. A. RICHWINE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2dMAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

3:DAR:jrm
3502
21 Jan 1981

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533 (Attn: SC-103)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)
Subj: Post Deployment Report, Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program (FFARP)
Ref: (a) WgO 3502.1A

1. In accordance with the reference, the following Post Deployment Report is hereby submitted.

2. Commanders Comments. Our deployment to FFARP at NAS Oceana on 20 October 1980 was a calculated risk aimed at providing valuable, but not readily available, training for the squadron aircrews. Viewed in that perspective, it was worthwhile.

The decision to attend FFARP was made in August, 1980 prior to our deployment to Orland, Norway for Teamwork 80. At that time we knew logistic support from MAG-31 would be limited, but were informed through liaison with NAS Oceana that we would be the only F-4 squadron there at the time, and we could therefore expect adequate support from the Navy at Oceana. This did not prove to be the case. Although the Navy provided excellent support where possible, several factors mitigated against what I would term a successful deployment:

a. The dissolution of TransLant planning/execution on the return trip from Orland, Norway resulted in our late return to Beaufort and a thirteen day turnaround between major squadron deployments. Even the nineteen days we had allowed for would have been too short.

b. Two aircraft carriers, with their aircraft, returned to port during our deployment. The arrival of the Navy F-4 squadrons and several thousand sailors at NAS Oceana dropped us out of contention for any priority on either billeting, transportation, or parts.

c. The loss of on-base billeting due to the fleet's arrival had a severe impact on morale. The enlisted Marines lived in World War II vintage open squad bays at Camp Pendleton without adequate communications, security, laundry facilities, recreation facilities, or readily available transportation between Camp Pendleton and NAS Oceana.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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d. Lack of available ground servicing equipment and test equipment severely hindered the maintenance effort.

e. A paucity of squadron pilots led to a breakdown of crew/section integrity which detracted from flight performance at FFARP, and curtailed training.

Despite these obstacles, the flying training was worthwhile... for several reasons:

- High quality instruction provided by VF-43.
- Skilled adversaries who provided cogent debriefs.
- TACTS range use for debriefing.
- Dedicated support from the employees of Flight Systems Inc., who maintained and operated the ACMI vans.
- General support from NAS Oceana AIMD and supply organizations.
- Sympathetic maintenance support from VF-43 and VF-171.

In sum, our participation in FFARP--though not optimal--was a valuable learning experience in many regards, not the least of which was the exposure and experience gained by our fighter crews. I feel, though, it extracted too great a price from our enlisted Marines in terms of unwarranted personal inconveniences.

I delayed submitting this report pending the arrival of the FFARP evaluation prepared by Flight Systems, Inc. of Newport Beach, California. We received that document on 22 December 1980.

3. Data

- a. Deployment Site - NAS Oceana, Va.
- b. Dates - 19 October 1980 - 7 November 1980
- c. Number of Aircraft - 11 F-4s
- d. Number of Personnel (Officer/SNCO/Enlisted) - 25/23/115
- e. Training Objectives Achieved - T&R syllabus training in Fighter Weapons (1v1, 2v1, 2v2 WC, 2v3, 2v4, 4v4). CRP changes included in October and November 1980 CRP submissions.
- f. Flight Hours - 161.2 day/4.0 night/9.3 actual instrument

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g. Sorties - Fighter Weapons - 121

Ferry - 22

Test - 7

Instrument/X-C - 5

h. Ordnance Expended - 172 IR Decoy Flares

i. Targets/Ranges Utilized - East Coast Tactical Air Combat Training Systems (TACTS) Range

j. CEP - N/A

4. Problems Encountered/Lessons Learned

a. Personnel. No significant problems were encountered in this area.

b. Intelligence. There was no intelligence play in the deployment. VF-43 has an excellent video tape library for threat/weapons systems briefing.

c. Operations

(1) Mission Scenarios

Comment: The FFARP syllabus provides for two scenarios-- fighter sweep and fleet air defense (FAD)/point defense, which are scheduled and flown separately. The majority of the missions are fighter sweeps which require no engagement but do call for a disengagement/"bug-out" maneuver. All sorties were flown "clean" (without external tanks) to facilitate negative "g" guns defense training maneuvers. Because of the high fuel consumption during ACM, it was seldom possible to complete two sweep runs per sortie, and the second run was generally degraded. If the second run were made a FAD scenario, more efficient use of fuel and training support agencies would prevail.

Recommendation: That FFARP syllabus sorties, commencing with 2v2 missions, be structured to consist of one sweep run and one FAD run per sortie.

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12 Jan 1981

(2) FFARP Syllabus Tailoring

Comment: The FFARP syllabus is established as a constant means of evaluating U.S. Navy squadrons which are at a certain state of readiness prior to a CV deployment. However, a USMC unit scheduled to participate in a FFARP is not necessarily at the same state of readiness as a predeployment Navy squadron, and therefore may benefit more from a FFARP which is tailored to its needs. The use of the FFARP as a means of evaluating the squadron may not be valid depending upon the status of aircrews assigned, work-up afforded, etc.. VF-43 will, generally, adjust/tailor the FFARP syllabus to the needs/desires of the USMC participating unit.

Recommendation: That a mutually agreeable syllabus be developed prior to each FFARP deployment. The following is a recommended basic syllabus:

- a. 1v1 - 2 sorties.
- b. 2v1 - 1 sortie.
- c. 2v2 - 2 sorties.
- d. 2v? - 4 sorties (mission flown Vs 2 plus wild, or 2v3 or 2v4).
- e. 4v4 - 2 sorties.
- f. Scenario mission - 2 sorties.

(3) Aircraft Configuration

Comment: In view of the proximity of the Navy TACTS Range to NAS Oceana and the enhanced training available in the "clean" configuration, we flew without external tanks while at FFARP. Carriage of an ACMR pod is mandatory for TACTS use, and AIM-9L captive missiles are available from FitWingOne. IR decoy flares should be carried on all sorties as their use is realistic and establishes sound tactical habit patterns.

Recommendation: That squadrons deploying to NAS Oceana for FFARP do so with "clean" aircraft, operational ALE-29 and IR flares, and LAU-17 and rails on each wing to facilitate carriage of ACMR pods/AIM-9s. Additionally, the use of the AIM-9L is highly recommended for FFARP evolutions due to the training value received.

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(4) Aircrew/Section Integrity

Comment: Aircrews and members of sections that fly regularly together become familiar with one and other and are generally more efficient than those who fly together infrequently. While at FFARP we were unable, because of external commitments and a shortage of pilots, to maintain crew integrity throughout the squadron. Predictably, those crewmen who flew together regularly were more effective than those who did not, and, I feel achieved a higher level of training readiness than the latter.

Recommendation: "Freeze" the squadron as it deploys to FFARP, and isolate it from external commitments. Allowing officers to be siphoned off to fill non squadron duties degrades training and wastes money.

(5) Aircrew Requirements

Comment: In order to participate in the FFARP with crew/section integrity, and to fulfill non-flying duties such as ODO, SDO, and Range Training Officer (RTO) at the TACTS, a minimum of ten full crews is required. Twelve full crews is desirable.

Recommendation: That F-4 squadrons participate in the FFARP with a minimum of twelve full aircrews.

(6) Participation of MACS Controllers

Comment: FFARP serves as an excellent training vehicle for GCI controllers. Via briefs, debriefs, and observation of the flight on the TACTS range displays, the controller learns the needs of the crews, why crews do what they do, and the effectiveness of aircrew plans/decisions. This squadron deployed with two MACS-5 controllers, who benefited from their opportunity to become more familiar with the F-4 flight regime.

Recommendation: Each fighter squadron should take at least two MACS controllers on a FFARP deployment.

(7) "Clinch" Control

Comment: The USN GCI site at Dam Neck, Va., call sign "Clinch", is a USN GCI controller training base. Its equipment is out of date and extremely unreliable, which degraded both the training received by our controllers and the quality of the control we received.

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Recommendation: USMC GCI controllers should participate in FFARP by acting as assistant Range Control Officers (RCO's) in the ACMI vans. The real-time audio visual display therein provides an invaluable opportunity for a controller to become vicariously acquainted with the air intercept/ACM environment.

d. Embarkation. The predeployment, deployment and retrograde phases were successfully accomplished due in large part to commendable flexibility at all levels. The embarkation process was complicated both by the time constraints on the submission of the requests due to Teamwork 80 and by a bird strike/fodded engine. The subsequent C-130 aircraft change required load adjustments which were handled smoothly and swiftly. Major delays were encountered but as stated above, maximum flexibility minimized the effect of the problems.

Recommendation: None.

e. Maintenance

(1) Avionics Test Equipment

Comment: Arrangements were made via Naval message between AIMD Oceana and the H&MS-31 Avionics Officer to have all known test equipment shortages issued to the squadron upon arrival at Oceana. AIMD subsequently refused to issue the test equipment directly to the squadron, insisting that VF-43 check out the needed items and loan them to VMFA-251. This routinely precipitated long delays in necessary maintenance. The equipment involved is shown below:

*TTU-205 Pressure Temp Test Set

*TTU-229 Auto Altitude Encoder Test Set

*ANAWM/52A Guided Missile Test Set

*70460-1 MSTs

*32E340018-1 VTAS Helmet Simulator

TF 20-1 Fuel Quantity Test Set

ANPSM-18B Auto Pilot Test Set

1502-04 O-Scope TDR

* Required for 35 day inspection

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Recommendation: That H&MS-31 issue all test equipment prior to any unit deployment to Oceana or make arrangements with AIMD to have equipment issued directly to the deploying unit.

(2) Insufficient Ground Support Equipment Available

Comment: Maintenance was delayed on numerous occasions due to a lack of GSE. Most of this equipment was to have been made available for our use; however, Oceana's squadrons were given priority. The lack of adequate nitrogen carts continually resulted in late launches.

Recommendation: That all GSE be provided from MAG-31 assets.

f. Ordnance. No significant problems/areas of concern were noted. AIM-9L missiles and ACMR pods were provided in sufficient quantities and in an efficient and timely manner by FitWingOne. IR decoy flares were the only ordnance expended.

Recommendation: None.

g. Facilities

(1) Billeting

Comment: Officers and Staff NCO's (E-7 and above) were billeted in the BOQ. SSGT's and below were billeted at Camp Pendleton Army National Guard Post. Camp Pendleton was less than adequate initially, but was made more habitable through the efforts of the Sergeant Major and the Maintenance Chief using assets from NAS Oceana's Special Services. There were pay telephones available and a makeshift direct phone was attached to a civilian land line to provide direct access to the VMFA-251 command element. However, the direct dial phone failed at mid-point of the deployment and could not be repaired. Security within the buildings at Camp Pendleton was nonexistent. Lockers were made available by Hangar 200, NAS Oceana, on a temporary loan basis. Some footlockers were available through the Post Supply, but not enough for each individual. Grounds and gate security after 1600 and on the weekends was provided by the squadron throughout the deployment. The initial linen service was provided by the Post Supply, but due to limited assets a weekly linen survey could not be provided. NAS Oceana could not provide a weekly linen survey due to the same limitations. Consequently, each individual became responsible for cleaning his own linen.

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Recommendation: The BOQ billeting for E-7's and above was adequate. Adequate billeting at NAS Oceana should be made available for E-6 and below. Nominally this means billet our Marines aboard NAS Oceana. Failing that, we must provide the necessary security for personal gear (wall and footlockers) as well as laundry, linen support, communications, and recreational gear. The advance party should arrive at NAS Oceana at least 2 working days prior to the main body to properly coordinate the assignment of billeting spaces, and to implement the logistics plan. I highly recommend a liaison visit two weeks prior to the deployment by the S-4 Officer and Sergeant Major in the event Camp Pendleton billeting is scheduled for use.

(2) Working Spaces

Comment: Spaces available in Hangar 200 were sufficient to house the entire maintenance operation. Ramp/aircraft space for the squadron was also satisfactory. A well stocked snack bar was available.

Recommendation: The coordination for maintenance requirements needs to be conducted earlier in the planning cycle and in greater detail. While the facilities and support were there, the ease with which we blended into the Navy systems of supply and AIMD support could have been better. (I.e., VF-43 had no idea that VMFA-251 would move into Hangar 200 as they expected that we would be hosted by a Navy F-4 squadron.)

(3) Transportation

Comment: Four rental cars were authorized; sixteen Marines were authorized POV at government expense and two drivers were assigned TAD from MWSG-27 Det "B" as bus driver support. Transportation to and from work was not a problem. Maintenance Control coordinated the bus for troop movements between shifts and meal hours. The four rental cars were pooled with the SDO for check-out by personnel needing transportation in support of flight operations, administration or supply runs off base.

Recommendation: That a minimum of four rental cars be available for every squadron deployment involving 12 aircrews (24 officers). The formula used for this determination was 5 personnel (officers) per automobile. Provisions should be made fiscally to support these operations at the tempo directed by the TEEP, taking into account the transportation needs of each squadron while on deployment. Two rental cars per squadron are insufficient, four rental cars are required.

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(4) Messing facilities and support were satisfactory throughout the deployment.


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